Recent Developments--Cases by Developments--Cases, Recent
Montana Law Review
Volume 36




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation




EMINENT DOMAIN AND CONDEMNATION OF PROPERTY
CITY OF HELENA v. DEWOLF
Urban renewal has been generally held to be an "area concept", and
therefore a city need not prove necessity for taking property once the area
boundaries have been established. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Some state courts have intervened, however, blocking a municipality from
exercising its general power of eminent domain when property has been
taken for speculative future use. 27 Am. Jur. 2d Eminent Domain § 404
(1966). In City of Helena v. DeWolf, - Mont. -, 508 P.2d 122, 30 St.
Rep. 372 (1973), the Montana supreme court joins those courts in the latter
group. Where "property is not reasonably necessary to the clearance of the
blighted area and prevention of its recurrence, the 'area concept' does not
prevail." DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 128.
As part of its plan for urban renewal, the City of Helena condemned
property, projecting that it would be used for a parking area upon the
completion of redevelopment. The district court found that the defense
had failed to present "clear and convincing proof that the taking is exces-
sive or arbitrary." DeWolf, 508 P.2d at 128. Defendant's position was that
the city failed "to show a reasonable need with the actual, or even reasona-
bly foreseeable, ability to complete the project for which the property is
needed."
The condemned property did not satisfy building code standards, but
the record indicated that improvements could and would be made but for
the litigation. Major emphasis was placed on the land's location. Standing
at the extreme edge of the project, the property could be eliminated from
the area plan without harming the project. Testimony showed that only
slight interference with placement of a street would result from the prop-
erty remaining unchanged. The city's need for the land, as parking area,
depended on redevelopment of the entire project area. Under the federal
program involved, an Urban Renewal Authority buys and clears the city
lots, but redevelopment is dependent on private investment.
Quoting extensively from Montana Power v. Bokma, 153 Mont. 390,
397, 399, 457 P.2d 769 (1964), the court discussed eminent domain and the
concept of "necessity." Necessity is judged according to the public use
under the circumstances of each case. Condemnation of private property
must be "compatible with the greatest public good and the least private
injury." Section 93-9906, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter
cited R.C.M. 1947]. Great weight is given to a municipality's selection of
property suitable for condemnation and redevelopment. However, a city's
only authority to condemn on an "area" basis is found in R.C.M. 1947, §11-
3908, which refers to urban renewal projects. No conclusive presumption
of necessity exists under the "area" condemnation authority such as that
existing under the general power of condemnation statute, R.C.M. 1947,
§11-977. R.C.M. 1947, §93-9905 defines "necessary" as meaning that:
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[T]he property taken must be reasonably requisite and proper for the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it is sought under the peculiar
circumstances of each case.
In DeWolf, the city, in order to prove necessity, had to show both the
amount of parking needed and that projected parking areas and structures
would be constructed. Presentation of a speculative future need for the
property was not sufficient to outweight the private injury.
Property owners faced with urban renewal condemnation proceedings
must still prove that the taking of the property would be excessive and
arbitrary, in order to defeat a municipality's right of eminent domain, but
the city will not be aided by a conclusive presumption that the taking is
necessary. More than a projected need must be established; proof that
redevelopment will occur to such an extent that the condemned property
will be essential to fill a public use must be presented. For the property
owner located on the perimeters of a redevelopment area, displaying pri-
vate loss, such as that of a successful business, may outweigh the public's
indefinite future need for the property.
Mike McCabe
THE ELEMENTS OF THE DEFENSE OF ENTRAPMENT IN MONTANA
HAMLIN v. DISTRICT COURT
In State ex rel Hamlin v. District Court of the First Judicial District,
- Mont. -, 515 P.2d 74, 30 St. Rep. 873 (1973), the issue presented
was whether the information should have been dismissed as a matter of
law on the ground that the defense of entrapment had been established.
The affirmative defense of entrapment arises when the criminal intent or
design originates in the mind of the police officer or informer and not with
the accused, and the accused is lured or induced into committing a crime
he had no intention of committing. Only when the criminal design origi-
nates in the mind of government officers, and the accused is persuaded by
deceitful representations or inducement into the commission of a criminal
act, can the defense of entrapment be established. State v. Karathanos,
158 Mont. 461, 493 P.2d 326, 331 (1972).
The court in Hamlin presented the following three essential elements
of entrapment: (1) Criminal intent or design originating in the mind of the
police officer or informer; (2) absence of criminal intent or design originat-
ing in the mind of the accused; and (3) luring or inducing the accused into
committing a crime he had no intention of committing. Hamlin, 515 P.2d
at 76.
The facts of the case are as follows: On May 29, 1973 an undercover
narcotics agent attempting to find illegal drug activity went to a bar in
East Helena. Shortly after his arrival, he approached a table where the
accused was sitting, and proceeded to buy him a drink. The agent inquired
whether Hamlin knew where he could get some "stash." Hamlin replied
that he did, and made a phone call. After the agent purchased another
drink for the accused, they made plans to drive to a house where Hamlin
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said he believed they could get some narcotics. Hamlin then drove to the
motel where the agent was staying, parked his car, got into the agent's car
and drove to the house. After arriving at the house Hamlin introduced the
agent to another man who sold the agent an L.S.D. pill for two dollars.
Later that night the man who originally answered the door asked if anyone
else wanted more L.S.D., and everybody, including the agent, indicated
that he did. The accused and this man left, returning ten minutes later,
and distributed some L.S.D. to the others, including the agent. Later that
morning the agent arrested Hamlin and charged him with the criminal sale
of L.S.D., a dangerous drug.
The motion to dismiss the information on the grounds of entrapment
was denied despite the defendant's argument that where a law enforce-
ment officer has no prior suspicion or information that an individual has
a propensity to commit an'offense and implants the idea in his mind, the
officer has in fact persuaded the accused to commit a crime he had no
intention of committing, thus establishing the defense of entrapment.
The court in rejecting this argument found that the testimony fell
short of establishing that the idea of procuring and selling L.S.D. was
implanted in Hamlin's mind by the agent. The court held that the testi-
mony simply revealed that the agent purchased the accused two drinks,
made an inquiry, and then passively followed the initiative of the accused.
A casual offer to buy, even if accompanied by persuasion, is not sufficient
to constitute entrapment, absent pleading, begging or coercing of the ac-
cused. Hamlin, 515 P.2d at 75.
Section 94-3-111 of the REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947), which went
into effect after this decision, codifies the law of entrapment in Montana.
According to this statute if the agent merely affords the accused the "op-
portunity or facility for committing an offense" which originated in the
mind of the accused, then entrapment is not established. Again, the
agent's activity must be something more than passive persuasion and
closer to active encouragement.
Most of the cases in which the defense of entrapment has been raised
have involved a crime in which there was a continuous course of conduct
resulting in repeated violations of the same nature, such as illegal drug
activity. In these kinds of situations the defense of entrapment becomes
very difficult to establish since the offense is usually committed secretly,
and it is extremely difficult to secure the evidence necessary to convict by
any means other than the use of decoys. This underlying rationale may
partially explain why the court in Hamlin was reluctant to dismiss on the
basis of entrapment.
Dana L. Christensen
CREDIT FOR TIME SPENT INCARCERATED PRIOR TO REVOCATION OF AN ORDER
DEFERRING IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE
MALDONADO, BOVEE, and GRAY
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CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] was applica-
ble to a defendant requesting credit for time spent incarcerated prior to a
revocation of a deferred imposition of sentence, the Montana supreme
court rested such speculation in three 1973 decisions: Maldonado v. Crist
__ Mont. -, 510 P.2d 887, 30 St.Rep. 576; State ex rel. Bovee v.
District Court, - Mont. , 508 P.2d 1056, 30 St.Rep. 437; and
Petition of Gray, - Mont. , 517 P.2d 351, 30 St.Rep. 1126.
Section 95-2215(a), R.C.M. 1947, provides in pertinent part:
Any person incarcerated on a bailable offense and against whom a judg-
ment of imprisonment is rendered shall be allowed credit for each day of
incarceration prior to or after violation.
The petitioner in Maldonado originally pleaded guilty to second de-
gree assault, and the district court, pursuant to R.C.M. 1947, §95-2206,
deferred imposition of sentence, placing the defendant on probation for
three years. Eleven months later the district court modified the order
deferring imposition of sentence on condition the defendant spend six
months in a county jail on a work release program. Subsequent to this six
month jail sentence, but prior to completion of his probation, the defen-
dant was charged with burglary. A hearing was held and upon finding that
the petitioner had violated the conditions of his order deferring imposition
of sentence, the court revoked the order and sentenced him to five years
and nine months in the state prison for his original crime. Maldonado filed
a writ of habeas corpus alleging that the six months in the county jail
should be credited against his prison sentence. The Montana supreme
court agreed.
In Bovee, the petitioner had served four months in the state prison as
a pre-condition to a deferred imposition of sentence for possession of dan-
gerous drugs. After serving the four months, the petitioner was released on
probation under an order deferring imposition of sentence. This order was
later revoked and the petitioner was sentenced to five years in the state
prison. The court held that the petitioner under R.C.M. 1947, §95-2215(a),
was entitled to credit the four months he served as a pre-condition to the
deferred imposition of sentence against his five year sentence.
The credit for time previously spent cannot be applied until judgment
has been entered. Under an order deferring imposition of sentence, judg-
ment is not imposed until the order is revoked. This point was illustrated
in Gray. Having been incarcerated for a month after his arrest, the peti-
tioner was entitled to credit the month of incarceration against his sent-
ence after the order deferring imposition of sentence was revoked, but he
could not credit the month against his probation period. Gray contended
that the month he had spent in jail prior to his entering a plea of guilty
for robbery should have been credited against his three years of probation.
Had the court accepted the petitioner's argument, he would have fulfilled
his three years of probation and would have been entitled to a new trial
for an offense commited during the last month of his probation. In rejecting
the argument, the court held that the month petitioner served would not
be credited until a judgment of imprisonment had been imposed. This did
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not occur until the court revoked the order deferring imposition of sent-
ence.
R.C.M. 1947, §95-2215(a), as interpreted by the Montana supreme
court in Maldonado, Bovee, and Gray, therefore, is applicable to a defen-
dant who spends time incarcertated after arrest and prior to imposition of
sentence. This time must be credited against any sentence that is subse-
quently imposed for the original crime for which the defendant was found
guilty.
A. Rogers Little
ARREST AS A PREREQUISITE OF MONTANA'S IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE
STATE v. MANGELS
Implied consent statutes provide that a person is deemed to have
given his consent to an intoxication test in exchange for the privilege of
driving on public roads. However, implied consent statutes in most states
require a valid arrest to trigger the consent provision prior to the adminis-
tration of an intoxication test. Note, "Arrest Requirement For Administer-
ing Blood Tests," 1971 Duke L.J. 601, 613. With its decision in State v.
Mangels, - Mont. - , P.2d -, 32 St. Rep. 177 (1975), the
Montana supreme court construed Section 32-2142.1, Revised Codes of
Montana (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947] to require an arrest
prior to administering an intoxication test only when the person is capable
of refusing consent, but in so doing set such high standards for establishing
incapacity to consent that for practical purposes Montana will still follow
the majority position.
In Mangels, the defendant was injured in a two-vehicle collision and
taken to the hospital. Having detected the odor of alcohol on his breath,
the investigating officer requested that the nurse take a blood sample for
determining the defendant's blood alcohol level. Defendant was not ar-
rested nor informed of the purpose of the test. A blood alcohol level of .19
was recorded. Defendant was then arrested for driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor.
The district court granted defendant's motion to suppress the blood
test for lack of a preceding arrest. On appeal the Montana supreme court
held that no arrest was required if the defendant were incapable of refusal,
but affirmed the district court ruling because the facts were insufficient
to show that the defendant was incapacitated.
The court rejected the rationale employed in State v. Mitchell, 245
So.2d 618 (Fla. 1971), which granted broad discretion to investigating offi-
cers in determining capacity to refuse an intoxication test. The court in
Mangels sought to avoid the potential for abuse. The court held that inca-
pacity is to be determined on the basis of the best evidence available to
the officer. However, the court noted that even the odor of alcohol, a
confused appearance, and an unstable condition, taken together, did not
warrant a finding of incapacity to refuse a blood alcohol test.
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forth by the United States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757, 768-70(1966) is less than the burden of establishing incapacity
to refuse a blood alcohol test as established in Mangels. The symptoms of
drunkenness in Schmerber, supra at 769, were that Schmerber's breath
smelled of alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot, watery and glassy appear-
ing. The United States Supreme Court held that on these facts there was
"plainly probably cause for the officer to arrest petitioner (Schmerber) and
charge him with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor." Schmerber, supra at 768. It follows that in Montana when
an investigating officer is in doubt as to the capacity of the person to refuse
a blood alcohol test, yet ascertains the test of probable cause to arrest for
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor is met, an arrest
must be made pursuant to paragraph (a) of R.C.M. 1947 §32-2142.1 in
order for the blood alcohol test to be admissible.
John Hollow
RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
STATE v. SANDERS
There is no constitutional basis for holding that the right to a speedy
trial can be quantified into a specified number of days or months. Further,
a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is
subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution
and the defendant are weighed. Some of the factors which courts should
assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived
of his right to a speedy trial are the length.of the delay, the reason for the
delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and the prejudice to the defen-
dant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). With its decision in State v.
Sanders, - Mont. -, 516 P.2d 372, 30 St. Rep. 1044 (1973), the
Montana supreme court not only accepts this balancing test but further
clarifies it, holding that a delay of slightly more than six months from
supreme court remand to trial is not prejudicial delay.
In Sanders the defendant was convicted of second degree assault. The
court imposed a deferred imposition of sentence which was subsequently
revoked and a four year sentence imposed. One of the grounds upon which
Sanders based his subsequent appeal was denial of a speedy trial.
The critical time sequence in Sanders began on October 18, 1971,
when the supreme court issued remittitur after reversing Sander's earlier
conviction of three counts of second degree assault. Trial was set for April
3, 1972. Defendant claimed on April 11 that he had not known of the trial
date. Trial was reset for April 19, but was finally held on May 10. At that
time a new conviction on one count of second degree assault was returned.
The court deferred imposition of sentence for three years. Subsequently,
the defendant pleaded guilty to disturbing the peace, and a petitition for
revocation of deferred imposition of sentence was filed. The deferred impo-
sition was revoked on October 17, nearly one year after the original remitti-
tur, and defendant was sentenced to four years in prison.
[Vol. 36
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In denying Sanders' allegation of a lack of speedy trial, the Montana
supreme court first quoted the balancing test and the four factors laid
down in Barker: (1) length of delay (2) reason for delay (3) waiver of right
to speedy trial and (4) prejudice from the delay. The court then summarily
rejected defenses on both the third and fourth factors, saying that the
defendant made no assertion of his right to speedy trial and that no actual
prejudice was shown. -
Regarding the first factor the court found no excessive delay. The
court said that the critical time period was from the date of remittitur
(October 18) to the date of trial (May 10)-six months and twenty-two
days. The court relied on the position of the American Bar Association
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Speedy Trial, section
2.2 (Approved Draft 1968) which provides that the time for determining
speedy trial after appeal begins when the order for the new trial is received
by the lower court.
Further, the court did not feel that the second factor, reason for the
day, was relevant in this case. The court said, "it appears the district court
gave the- cause the reasonable prompt calendar consideration required...
The delays that followed, if not chargeable to defendant, certainly cannot
be charged to the state." It pointed out that the first delay was chargeable
to defendant's counsel, the second flowed fromt he first and the third was
unexplained.
The prime consideration of the Montana supreme court in this area
concerned the time period involved. It held that a delay of six months,
twenty-two days, was not excessive without a showing that such delay was
caused by the state, that the defendant had asserted his right to a speedy
trial, or that the defendant had been prejudiced by the delay.
Mayo Ashley
WAIVER OF DEFENSES UPON PLEA OF GUILTY
STATE v. TURCOTTE
A plea of guilty, in order to be valid under the requirements of the Due
Process Clause, must be voluntarily made without coercion and must be
entered with an understanding of the charges and the consequences of
entering the plea. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-244 (1969). It is
the well-established rule that when these conditions are satisfied, a plea
of guilty constitutes a waiver of all but jurisdictional deficiencies in the
proceedings against the accused. Cook, Constitutional Rights of The Ac-
cused-Pre-Trial Rights § 113 (1972). With its decision in State v.
Turcotte, - Mont. , - P.2d - , 31 St. Rep. 547 (1974), the
Montana supreme court places itself squarely with this majority rule and
answers the question of whether any deficiencies may be preserved before
entering a guilty plea with a resounding "NO."
In Turcotte, the defendant was charged with criminal possession of
dangerous drugs on evidence found in his residence under a search warrant.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, but his motion was denied
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defendant entered his plea but before doing so advised the court that he
was preserving his right to raise the illegal search issue upon appeal. The
court in Turcotte, 31 St. Rep. at 549, denied the appeal stating that:
A plea of guilty voluntarily and understandingly made constitutes a
waiver of nonjurisdictional defects and defenses, including claims of viola-
tions fo constitutional rights prior to the plea . . . (Emphasis added.)
The holding was based upon the theory that the defendant is con-
victed on his plea and not upon the evidence, thus any challenge to the
admissibility of the evidence backing up the charge is immaterial. The
court noted that section 95-1606 of the REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947),
does not provide for conditional pleas and held, in effect, that in order to
raise questions of inadequacies in the pre-trial proceedings, the defendant
must stand trial, be convicted, and appeal on the record. There can be no
intentional preservation of pre-trial procedural or constitutional questions
in a plea of guilty.
It should be noted, though, that the defendant is not entirely fore-
closed from appealing a conviction based on a plea of guilty. In citing
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1972), the court reaffirmed that the
defendant may attack the voluntariness of the plea by showing coercion
or inadequate advice from counsel concerning the nature and effect of the
plea. Additionally, it has been recently held by the Ninth Circuit that a
defendant may challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which
he was convicted after pleading guilty. Jellum v. Cupp, 475 F.2d 829 (9th
Cir. 1973). Otherwise, however, a plea of guilty is a bar to any appeal in
Montana.
Staff
SEARCH OF AN AUTO PURSUANT TO A LAWFUL ARREST
STATE v. TURNER
It is well-settled that a search incident to a lawful arrest is an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. This exception has been formulated into two distinct
categories. The first is that a search may be made of the person of the
arrestee, and the second is that a search may be made of the area within
the control of the arrestee. While the validity of a search of the person has
been regarded as settled from its enunciation, the validity of the search in
the second category has been subject to differing Supreme Court interpre-
tations as to the extent of the area which may be searched, as well as on
what occasion it may be searched. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973). It is this second area of search that the Supreme Court of Montana
dealt with in its recent decision of State v. Turner, - Mont. -, 523
P.2d 1386, 31 St.Rep. 494 (1974). Although the United States Supreme
Court has been less than clear in its decisions about this question, the
Montana supreme court appears to stretch to its outer limits the scope of
search of an automobile pursuant to an arrest.
[Vol. 36
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Police officers arrested Turner for operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was driven to the station in the
police car while another police officer drove the defendant's car to the
station. In driving the car to the station, the officer noticed a beer bottle
and near it on the floor a small paper bag containing marijuana. The officer
took the bag and the bottle as evidence, returned to the car, made a
complete inspection without a warrant, and found a marijuana cigarette
in the ash tray. The defendant was then charged with the additional of-
fense of possession of marijuana. The district court suppressed the use of
these two items of marijuana as evidence, and the Montana Supreme court
found such suppression to be error.
The court seemed to base its holding on the proposition enunciated
in Robinson that police officers may make a complete body search pur-
suant to lawful arrest in a traffic violation. The court in Turner, 523 P.2d
at 1387, cited Robinson and its companion case Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1974), as stating the rule applicable to this case:
• ..Thus the broadly stated rule and the reasons for it, have been repeat-
edly affirmed in the decisions of this court since Weeks v. United States
nearly sixty years ago. Since the statements in these cases speak not
simply in terms of an affirmative authority to search, they clearly imply
that such searches must also meet the 4th Amendment's requirement of
reasonableness.
The court stated that the real issues of the case was whether the
actions of the police were reasonable, and then concluded by looking at the
Montana statute on searches, REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §95-702 (1947),
that indeed the actions were reasonable. It is unquestionable that all
searches and seizures, even those without warrants, must be reasonable.
In auto search cases reasonableness implies a weighing of the interests
presented in each case, and the "exigent circumstance" requirement im-
plies not just a police need, but a police need sufficient to override the
interests of a private citizen. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of
Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. REV. 835 (1.74).
It is both puzzling and troublesome that the decision did not contain
any mention of the United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the
warrantless search of an auto, nor did it contain any mention of the
circumstances or guidelines used by the Court in determining when the
actions of police officers are reasonable. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 433 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364
(1964); United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
While the Burger Court has been gradually strengthening the hands
of law enforcement officials in searching autos pursuant to an arrest, the
Court still recognizes a balancing of the interests involved and whether the
police could have obtained a warrant- before the search. In spite of the
moving automobile and exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the Court in Chambers did say that neither Carroll, nor other
cases "require or suggest that in every conceivable circumstance the search
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tion for privacy which a warrant affords." 399 U.S. 42, 50 (1970). The most
recent United States Supreme Cmurt case, Roaden v. Kentucky, - U.S.
., 93 S. Ct. 2796, 2802 (1974) states that:
Only in exigent circumstances will the judgement of the police as to
probable cause serve as sufficient authorization for a search. Exigent cir-
cumstances are those in which police action must literally be now or never
to preserve the evidence of the crime.
The federal decisions in this area have been so often cloudy and con-
tradictory that the Montana supreme court's failure to clearly analyze the
issues in the Turner case is understandable. The only readily identifiable
principle in these cases has been that warrants-when practicable is the best
policy. Some of the justices of the United States Supreme Court have
called for an overhauling of the law of search and seizure, and such a
revamping would hopefully provide law enforcement officials, county at-
torneys and state judges with rules that can be easily understood and
readily applied.
Mae Nan Robinson Ellingson
REMEDY FOR DISCHARGE FOR WAGE GARNISHMENT
STEWART v. TRAVELERS CORPORATION
A Montana employee is presently protected, under both federal and
Montana law, from being discharged for a single garnishment of his wages.
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §1674(a) (1968); Revised Codes of
Montana, §41-305.1 (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947]. The extent
of the protection afforded an employee who has been discharged in viola-
tion of the law depends, however, upon the remedy available to him.
R.C.M. 1947, §41-305.1 was enacted into law in 1969. No express reme-
dies were provided in the statute, and there are presently no reported cases
construing it. Therefore, the protection it affords an employee discharged
in violation of this law is not presently clear. Two express remedies were
provided to enforce the federal statute. 15 U.S.C. §1674(a) establishes a
criminal penalty for employers who wilfully violate the federal statute in
discharging an employee for a single garnishment of his wages. Secondly,
the Secretary of Labor is given the duty of enforcing the federal statute,
15 U.S.C. §1676. These remedies were of little utility to a wrongfully dis-
charged employee, however, for the administrative enforcement was non-
existent and the criminal penalty required the proof of a "willful" dis-
charge.
In Stewart v. Travelers Corporation, 503 F.2d 108 (9th Cir. 1974), the
court greatly broadened the protection afforded an employee under the
federal statute. In that case the Ninth Circuit ruled there is an implied
private civil remedy available under 15 U.S.C. §1674(a), which allows an
employee who was discharged in violation of the statute to sue in his own
right for reinstatement, back-pay, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.
This ruling is contrary to prior district court rulings in other circuits hold-
[Vol. 36
10
Montana Law Review, Vol. 36 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol36/iss2/12
1975] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 353
ing that there was no private civil remedy under the statute. Western v.
Hodgson, 359 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.W.Va. 1973); Oldham v. Oldham, 337 F.
Supp. 1039 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Simpson v. Sperry Rand Corp., 350 F. Supp.
1057 (W.D. La 1972). The reason the Ninth Circuit gave for implying such
a remedy was to more fully effectuate the congressional intent expressed
in the statute.
The effect of this recent ruling is to give a Montana employee full
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